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1. Introduction
Occupational pension schemes are an important element of the pension systems 
of many countries. In the face of problems related to the financing of public 
systems, private forms of saving for retirement are becoming crucial (Antolin et 
al. 2012, p. 7). In recent years, changes in the types of occupational pension 
schemes can be observed. The once popular defined benefit (DB) schemes are 
replaced by defined contribution (DC) schemes (Wise 2001, p. 122; Turner and 
Hughes 2008; Bovenberg and Gradus 2015). As a result the risk associated with 
financing the pension scheme is transferred from the employer to the member. In 
order to enable risk sharing hybrid schemes have been developed in many 
countries by combining elements of two traditional forms (Turner 2014; Broeders 
et al. 2013). They are often a modification of the DB scheme e.g. by introduction 
of an indexation conditional on the financial position of the scheme, as is the case 
in the Netherlands (Blommestein et al. 2009, Ponds and van Riel 2009). On the 
other hand, the growing popularity of DC schemes has contributed to the 
development of hybrid programs that modify such a scheme by, for example, 
introduction of a guarantee on the minimum rate of return on investment, as is the 
case in Switzerland (Bütler and Staubli 2010). In addition, many authors search 
for solutions that would offer the benefits of the DC scheme for the employer (pre-
determined contributions) with the advantages of the DB scheme for the member 
(pre-determined benefits). 
Sutcliffe (2010) presented a proposal for a retirement program which satisfies the 
above criteria. It uses a deferred pensions financed by a single premium (SPDA – 
single premium deferred annuity). Aim of this paper is to construct a model that 
would allow to calculate expected benefit amount in a scheme financed by SPDA, 
and to compare it with an amount that could be achieved in a traditional DC 
scheme. Second aim is to extend the concept of SPDA scheme to allow for the 
risk of high annuity prices to be shared between member and employer.  
2. Scheme financed by SPDA
Scheme which uses single premium deferred annuities (SPDA) was described by 
Sutcliffe in 2010. SPDA is an insurance product which can be purchased at any 
time by paying a single premium, in exchange for payment of the benefit (pension) 





price of the deferred pension by adopting assumptions as to the probability  
of survival of the insured until the start of payment, further life expectancy from 
the time of start of payment or the interest rate used to discount future value  
of benefit to the time of purchase. 
In a scheme financed by SPDA a contribution (determined in advance as  
a percentage of the member's salary) is paid every year. It is used to purchase  
a deferred pension, the payment of which will begin when the member retires at  
a certain age in the future. In this way, the contributions are defined in advance 
(as in the DC scheme), while the benefit is fixed (as in the DB scheme) at the time 
the deferred pension is bought. The use of various types of deferred annuities, e.g. 
those offering a benefit adjusted with inflation, paid for a specified period of time 
or until the end of the member's life, allows the type of benefit to be adapted  
to the requirements of a given occupational scheme or a given member.  
An additional advantage of this solution is the fact that the investment risk and the 
longevity risk are borne by the insurance company offering the deferred pension, 
and not by the employer (as in the DB scheme) or the member (as in the DC 
scheme). Insurance companies are subject to strict legal regulations, which 
reduces the risk that the benefit will not be paid to the member (Sutcliffe 2010, 
pp. 16-18). 
The disadvantage of this solution is the underdeveloped market of deferred 
pensions in many countries, which means that buying this product may not be 
possible or may be very expensive (Blake 1999, p. 360). In addition, the costs that 
the insurance company will take into account when calculating the pension price 
may be higher than the management costs in the program offered by the employer. 
Sutcliffe (2010, p. 21) notes that the use of deferred pensions will likely result  
in a lower amount of benefit than that obtained in the DC or DB scheme.  
The member is also exposed to the risk of an unknown purchase price of the 
deferred pension, which may increase in relation to the assumed. 
 
3. Assumptions 
In order to compare benefit amount that could be achieved in a scheme financed by 
SPDA and a traditional DC scheme models of both schemes were constructed. It was 
assumed that a member saves for their retirement for 35 years, during which 
contributions are paid annually at the start of each year, and retires aged 60. 
Contribution rate was set at 3.5% of salary, the required contribution in the new 
occupational schemes in Poland. The assumptions are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Assumptions used in modelling benefit amount in pension schemes 
Parameter Value 
Retirement age 60 years 
Saving period 35 years 
Contribution rate 3.5% of salary 
Salary increase rate 1% per annum 
Source: own work. 
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In a DC scheme, the contributions are accumulated in the member’s account with 
an investment rate of return earned by the scheme’s investments. Model assumes 
that investment rate each year is a random variable following normal distribution 
with mean 3% and standard deviation 8%. At retirement value accumulated in the 
account is used to purchase an annuity from an insurance company. The price 
of this annuity is calculated using interest rate of 1% and expected future lifetime 
of a person aged 60 according to the formula: 
𝑎 | (1) 
where i is the annual interest rate and n is the expected future lifetime in whole 
years. If expected future lifetime is not an integer, an additional payment equal  
to a fraction of the last year survived will be made. It is assumed that when the 
member joins the scheme the expected future lifetime of a person aged 60 is equal 
to 21.85 (GUS 2018), and by the time of member’s retirement in 35 years this 
expected future lifetime for a person aged 60 will have increased by a certain 
amount every year. This amount is a random variable which follows normal 
distribution, with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.05 (see also Gierusz 2019). 
In a scheme financed by SPDA contribution paid is used to purchase a deferred 
annuity from an insurance company. This annuity is priced by calculating the 
value of annuity payable to a person aged 60 (as described above) and discounting 
it to the time of purchase using a certain discount rate, according to the formula: 
𝑎 || 𝑝 𝑎 | (2) 
where r is the annual discount rate, k is the number of years remaining till member 
reaches 60 years of age, x is the current member’s age, kpx is the probability that 
a member aged x survives the next k years. 
It is assumed that discount rate follows normal distribution, with mean μ and 
standard deviation 1%. Mean μ itself is also a random variable following normal 
distribution, with mean 2% and standard deviation 0.5%. A lower mean for 
discount rate was chosen than for an investment rate (2% vs 3%) due to the fact 
that discount rate is set by insurance company based on expected return  
on investments that will be used to back up the pension guarantee. These are likely 
to be more secure investments, such as corporate and government bonds, in 
comparison with investments that could be used by a DC scheme, such as equities 
and other more risky assets (see also Sutcliffe 2010, p.22). In addition,  
the insurance company will include its costs and profit margins in the discount 
rate. The insurance company also takes into account probability that the member 
will survive from the time of purchase to retirement using life Tables as published 
by (GUS 2018). The amount of member’s pension is then calculated as the sum 
of all the deferred pensions purchased during the scheme membership. 
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4. Results
Method of simulation of different financial and demographic scenarios was used 
to calculate and compare benefit amounts that could be achieved in both pension 
schemes. One of those scenarios is presented in more detail below. Figure 1 shows 
expected deferred annuity prices (calculated assuming that random variables – 
discount rate and expected future lifetime – will take values equal to expected 
value) and actual deferred annuity prices observed in this particular scenario. 
Fig. 1. Expected and actual deferred annuity prices in analysed scenario 
Source: own work. 
As shown in Figure 1, expected annuity prices increase with time left  
to retirement. This is mostly due to shorter discounting period. Using these 
expected prices, the expected benefit amount (expressed as % of member’s final 
salary) was 7.3%. The actual prices were broadly similar to expected, with some 
deviations, for example in year 14 when the actual price was much higher than 
expected due to low discount rate in this year. 
Each year a contribution rate paid into the scheme financed by SPDA was used  
to purchase a deferred pension payable from age 60. Figure 2 presents how the 
total member’s pension (sum of all deferred pensions purchased each year) was 
accumulated. Amounts are expressed as percentage of member’s final salary. 
Each year the total pension accumulated by that time is split between accumulated 





Fig. 2. Pension (expressed as % of final salary) accumulated each year, split 
between accumulated in the current and in previous years 
Source: own work. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the pension amount (expressed as % of final salary) 
increases in an almost linear way. Black rectangles show how much of the pension 
was bought using current year’s contribution, and grey show total pension benefit 
bought in previous years. 
In this scenario, at retirement the total pension amount was equal to 7.2% of final 
salary. In comparison, the replacement rate that could have been achieved from  
a DC scheme was slightly higher, and equal to 8.3% of final salary. 
The simulations were then repeated 10000 times and for each scheme mean and 
standard deviation of benefit amount were calculated. These are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation of benefit amount as % of final salary in each 
scheme – simulation results 
Scheme Mean benefit amount 
Standard deviation of benefit 
amount 
DC 8.1% 2.5% 
SPDA 7.5% 0.8% 









The mean replacement rate for a DC scheme was slightly higher than in the SPDA 
scheme due to higher mean investment rate assumed for reasons explained above. 
The variability of results was much lower in case of SPDA scheme, as it is not 
subject to year on year variability in investment rates, but only to variability in 
annuity prices. An additional advantage is that the member can observe the 
amount of pension that is being accumulated in SPDA every year (as shown in 
Figure 2), but in a DC scheme the pension amount remains unknown until 
retirement when it is purchased, hence member is also at risk of sudden changes 
in either investment rate or annuity price at retirement. 
In the scenario investigated in more detail above the replacement rate obtained in 
SPDA scheme (7.2%) was slightly below the expected (7.3%). This was due to high 
deferred annuity prices in some years. Member in this scheme is exposed to risk of 
high annuity prices, leading to a low benefit obtained from the scheme. In order to 
share this risk between member and employer the following modification of SPDA 
scheme was constructed, making it a hybrid scheme. If the actual deferred annuity 
price in a given year was much higher than the expected price, additional employer 
contribution was paid into the scheme so that the effect of higher actual price did not 
lower significantly the amount of pension bought.  
Firstly a price indicator for a given year was calculated as a ratio of actual and 
expected prices minus 1, expressed in %. Secondly, a new required deferred annuity 
price was calculated as follows: 
– if the price indicator was below 5% required price stayed the same as actual
price,
– if the price indicator was between 5% and 20%, the required price was equal
to expected price times 105%,
– if the price indicator was over 20% the required price was equal to expected
price times (100% + price indicator – 15%).
The benefit amount purchased in a given year was then based on the required 
price, and employer had to pay an extra contribution equal to a difference between 
the amount required to purchase such a benefit and the contribution paid that year. 
Figure 3 presents benefit amount purchased each year in the hybrid SPDA scheme. 
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Fig. 3. Pension (expressed as % of final salary) bought each year, split between 
amount bought by normal contributions and extra employer contributions 
Source: own work. 
In the investigated scenario the actual price was higher than the expected price by 
more than 5% in 17 out of 35 scheme years. In those years extra contributions were 
paid by employer, increasing the amount of benefit bought to 7.4%. Simulations  
of different scenarios were then run and results are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of benefit amount as % of final salary in SDPA 





of benefit amount 
Proportion of 
scenarios were 
benefit was lower 
than expected 
SPDA 7.5% 0.8% 42% 
Hybrid SPDA 7.7% 0.7% 30% 
Source: own work. 
As shown in Table 3, by sharing the risk of high deferred annuity prices between 
member and employer the mean benefit amount was increased, and variability  
of the benefit amount was lowered. This was achieved by additional employer 
contributions. Mean employer contribution was 3% of member’s final salary,  
and on average the contribution was required in 11.8 out of 35 scheme years. 
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5. Conclusions
Pension scheme financed by SPDA combines features of a DC scheme (fixed 
contribution amount) with those of a DB scheme (part of benefit amount is fixed 
once the deferred annuity is purchased). The simulations performed in this paper 
have shown that the mean benefit amount obtained by the member from such 
a scheme was lower than that which could be obtained in a traditional DC scheme, 
but it was characterized by a lower variability (lower standard deviation of benefit 
amount). An additional advantage of SPDA scheme is that the member can 
monitor the amount of benefit already purchased at any time of the scheme 
membership, in contrast to the DC scheme where the benefit remains unknown 
until retirement. 
One of the main risks to the member in scheme financed by deferred annuities is 
the risk of high annuity prices. A modification of the scheme allows to share this 
risk between member and employer by obliging the employer to pay additional 
contributions in years when annuity prices are much higher than expected. Such  
a hybrid scheme was proposed and investigated in this paper. Simulations have 
shown that the mean benefit amount was slightly higher than in a SPDA scheme 
with no risk sharing, with lower standard deviation and lower proportion of 
scenarios where the benefit was lower than expected. 
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